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One of the most productive fields for the
economic application of centralized management
is in the provision of common supplies and
related services to all the Military Departments.
After a rather comprehensive study of this
entire problem, we came to the conclusion that
considerable economy and efficiency could be
gained If all the common supply management
activities were consolidated into a single
agency. Accordingly, a new Defense Supply
Agency was established and placed directly under
the Secretary of Defense.
The new organization has a big job ahead
of it. I am sure that it will encounter some
difficulties during its first year of operation,
but I am equally confident that in the long run
it will improve supply support to the operating
forces while materially reducing the cost to
the taxpayer.
So spoke Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in
1961, shortly after announcing an unprecedented undertaking, the
establishment of an agency, independent of the military services,
responsible for the provision of common supply and service
support to the military services.
The events which led to the establishment of the
Defense Supply Agency (DSA) may be viewed as a slow evolutionary
process, fraught with controversy at every step of the way. The
Robert S. McNamara, quoted in U.S., Defense Supply
Agency, An Introduction to the Defense Supply Agency
,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962)
, p. v.

principal proponents of the "single-agency" concept, among whom
were influential members of Congress and the prestigious Hoover
Commission, argued against the duplication, overlapping of
functions and waste inherent in the proliferation of military
supply systems dealing with supplies commonly used by two or
more services. The opponents of integrated materiel management,
while recognizing the need for improvement, argued that
integration under the "single-agency" concept was an unsatis-
factory trade-off of individual military service authority and
control for the sake of economy. Or viewed in another way, it
was considered to be a trade-off of effectiveness for efficiency,
a price that the military services were unwilling to pay.
After seven years of operation with DSA, there is no
longer any serious speculation concerning the possibility that
the responsibility for management of common supplies and services
will again be decentralized to the military services. Integrated
materiel management in some form is here to stay. The question
now is how has DSA met the challenge presented in its charter,
i.e. "providing the most effective and economical support of
common supplies and services to the military departments and
other DOD components."
The purpose of this study, then, is to examine the role
of DSA as the principal integrated materiel manager for the
"TF.S., Department of Defense, Defense Supply Agency
(DSA)
. Directive Number 5105.22, November 6, 1961.

Department of Defense and how the challenge of "providing the
most effective and economical support" has been met. The approach
will include a review of events which led to the establishment
of DSA in order to understand the climate in which integrated
materiel management evolved. An examination will be made of
the requisites for effective integrated materiel management to
determine how DSA has met these requisites. Of primary interest
will be the experience of DSA during the Vietnam War, for this
has certainly provided the greatest test to date of DSA ' s ability
to meet the challenge. An analysis of DSA's approach to
integrated materiel management will be undertaken to determine
its strengths, weaknesses and potential. Prom this, implications
for the future will be derived.

CHAPTER I
TRENDS TOWARD INTEGRATED MATERIEL
MANAGEMENT SINGE WORLD WAR II
Background
Although the concept of integrated materiel management
as we know it today did not develop until after World War II,
the question of how "best to provide the military services with
common supplies and services was seriously discussed as far back
as World War I. A suggestion to Bernard Baruch, Chairman of the
War Industries Board, that a single agency be established to
purchase all military supplies, was rejected on the ground that
there were many overriding advantages in the decentralized systems
then in use.
In the intervening period between the two wars, there
was almost continuous congressional interest in the subject of
management of common supplies and services. Many bills aimed at
consolidation of military logistics functions were introduced in
the Congress. Proposals to consolidate the procurement function
were integral parts of all these bills. However, major proposals
were successively rejected by congressional committees and the
military departments, primarily on the ground that they were not
U.S. , Department of Defense, Integrated Management of
Common Supply Activities, Report of the Study Committee , July 11,
1961, p. I 1.

in the best interest of the nation.
With the advent of World War II, military supply
became "big business." The impact on the nation's economy was
unprecedented. As a result, the Congress focused increased
attention on the duplication and inefficiencies of the separate
military supply systems. Illustrative of the thinking within the
Congress which emphasized the need for improved methods to
eliminate duplication and waste, was the testimony of Represent-
ative Wadsworth of New York before the Woodrum committee, during
hearings in 19kk on a proposal to establish a single Department
of Armed Forces:
• . • let's take a look at what we call our postwar
period. Let us estimate some of the elements which will
be influential in swaying the Judgement, rightly or
wrongly, of the people and the Congress of that day.
When this war is over it may be that we shall have run
up a national debt approaching $300,000,000.
. . • Already we visualize other financial obligations
or commitments. • • • And do not forget that while
these expenditures are going on, the taxpayers, millions
of them, crying for some measure of relief, may turn
desperately to find a place where big slashes can be
achieved. It is more than probable that their attention
will be riveted upon the military services and that the
cry will go up all over the country that there aren't
going to be any more wars; that we do not need more
than a flimsy skeleton of a national defense structure.
That's what happened in 1920. That is what
happened after every war in which we have engaged. I
do not need to remind you of the cruel, bitter price
which our country has paid in lives and treasure as a
result of that sort of performance back through the
years. In all seriousness I say to the men in
responsible command in all our military services that
they must look ahead and be prepared to Justify before
the Congress and the people of that day the maintenance
of adequate military forces. And in preparing the
services against that day they must cooperate one with
the other in every conceivable effort in the reduction
of expenditures to wipe out all unnecessary duplication,

to eliminate waste . . . the solutions which we
recommend may well be inadequate unless the services
themselves join hands, one with the other, and help
us. By so doing you may contribute the greatest
measure of assistance to us in our work. But more
important still, you may erect a sound and under-
standable defense against those traditional postwar
tendencies to which I have referred. Do not forget
what happened in the past.l
National Security Act of 19li7
Although many proposals were made and many bills were
introduced prior to and during World War II to consolidate
military logistics functions, the first significant legislation
with respect to such consolidation was the National Security Act
of 1914-7. Even so, this was a small first step. This act, which
provided the basic framework for the current Department of Defense
organization by the creation of the National Military Establish-
ment, did not provide for a separate common supply agency, as
had been previously suggested.
However, of primary significance was the explicit
assignment of responsibility to the Secretary of Defense for
positive action to eliminate duplication and waste in military
logistics management:
... the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate
steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping
in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation,
storage, health and research.^
1U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs,




, 19145, p. 690.
National Security Act of 19147 . Public Law 80-253,
80th Cong., 61 Stat. 1^95, sec. 202(a)(3), 191+7.

The National Security Act of 19l;7 established the
Munitions Board as a staff agency of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and gave it statutory authority for coordinating the
logistic efforts of the military departments. However, it is
important to recognize that the Munitions Board was not delegated
any decision-making authority. Rather, its duties consisted
primarily of making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
for his approval and implementation. A further limitation on the
effectiveness of the Munitions Board was that much of its detailed
work had to be conducted on a committee basis because it had to
rely on the use of existing operating units in the three military
departments.
While the National Security Act of 1947 laid the
groundwork for future integration of common supply functions,
little discernible progress was made in that direction in the
years immediately following passage of the act. In attempting to
understand the reason for this lack of progress, it is necessary
to understand the concept under which the National Military
Establishment came into being:
. . .
The concept of this first unification law was
federation, not merger, of the armed forces. It created
a federated agency, unique in the executive branch,
entitled the National Military Establishment. This
Establishment was not itself an executive department
but consisted mainly of three separate executive depart-
ments—the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the
"Tf.S. , Department of Defense, Integrated Management of
Common Supply Activities
, p. I 2.

8Air Force. Each department retained all powers not
expressly delegated by the unification law to the
Secretary of Defense. The civilian heads of the
departments, although subordinate in certain respects
to the Defense Secretary, retained the statutory
right of direct access to the Director of the Budget
and the President. The head of the National Military
Establishment, entitled "Secretary of Defense," was
given four specific duties which were so worded in
the law as to limit his role to that of a coordinator-
-more of a supervisor than administrator. These duties
were, first, to establish general policies and programs;
second, to exercise general direction, authority, and
control; third, to eliminate unnecessary duplication
and overlapping in certain specific fields; and,
fourth, to exercise certain budgetary authority over
the departments and agencies of the National Military
Establishment. The law gave the President and the
Secretary of Defense direction over the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and gave the Secretary of Defense direction ^
over the boards and agencies of the Military Establishment.
Under this concept of federation or unification by
coordination, little progress toward integration of logistics
functions could be expected and little progress materialized.
First Hoover Commission Recommendations
The Committee on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, commonly known as the first Hoover Commission,
recognized the inadequacy of defense organization under the
Nntional Security Act and made certain recommendations to correct
the deficiencies. The 19^9 amendments to the National Seourity
Act of 19I4.7 met the criticisms of the first Hoover Commission by
creation of the Department of Defense as an executive department
and by increasing the authority of the Secretary of Defense,
u.S>,, Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Unification and Strategy , H. Doc. 600, 8lst Cong., 2d sess.,
1950, pp. 1-2.

making him the principal assistant to the President on national
defense.
The concept of this new law, as contrasted to
the federation concept of the original Unification
Act, was one of centralized, clearly defined civilian
authority in one executive department. The loosely
joined system of three executive departments, each
with direct access to the President, was discarded.
The new law changed the synonym of unification from
"coordination" of the armed forces to "centralization"
under the Secretary of Defense. 1
Another integrating influence which resulted from the
first Hoover Commission report was the establishment of the
General Services Administration under the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 191+9. The administrator was
delegated broad authority to assume supply responsibilities for
all federal agencies, including the military services. However,
the potential impact of this provision was, to a large extent,
nullified by another provision of the act which gave the
Secretary of Defense authority to exempt the National Military
Establishment from such aotion by the General Services Admin-
pistration.
O'Mahoney Amendment
Disclosures of supply inadequacies by the Bonner
subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee in 1961
caused the Deputy Secretary of Defense to direct the Munitions
^"Ibid.
, p. 3.
2"Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of
19U9 . Public Law Hl-152, 51st Cong., sec. 201(a), 191{-9, p. 9.
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Board to sot up a supply systems study project for each category
of materiel, "Priority consideration" was to be given to
"the feasibility of assigning to a single military department
the responsibility for procurement, distribution, including depot
storage and issue for classes of common items of supply and
equipment and depot maintenance of such equipment." Since the
Bonner subcommittee had pointed out that the Army and Navy each
had five medical supply depots in the United States, the
Secretary of Defense directed that a feasibility test be under-
taken at Alameda, California, to determine if the Army could
satisfactorily distribute medical supplies in that area to the
Navy. This feasibility test came to be known as the Alameda
Medical Test. 1
Further disclosures by the Bonner subcommittee that the
Air Force was building a separate supply system for common use
items resulted in the O'Mahoney Amendment to the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act of 1953* This amendment required the
Secretary of Defense to issue mandatory regulations to the
military services with respect to procurement, production, ware-
phousing and distribution of supplies and equipment.
The apparent intent of the following provision of the
O'Mahoney amendment was to ensure secretarial review of the
existing military supply systems with a view toward eliminating
"hj.S., Congress, Joint Economio Committee, Background
Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply
,






duplication and overlap of functions, thereby facilitating the
establishment of an integrated supply system:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and
for the purpose of achieving an efficient, economical,
end practical operation of an integrated supply system
designed to meet the needs of the military departments
without duplicating or overlapping of either operations
or functions, no officer or agency in or under the
Department of Defense, after the effective date of this
section, shall obligate any funds for procurement,
production, warehousing, distribution of supplies or
equipment or related supply management functions, except




The action taken by the Secretary of Defense to im-
plement the 'Mahoney amendment, while probably meeting the
letter of the law, did not appear to comply with congressional
intent:
The main consequence of the 'Mahoney amendment
was the issuance of directives by the Secretary of
Defense restating or reaffirming existing regulations
under which the military departments, agenoies, and
offices obligated funds for the varied supply activities
within their cognizance.
2
Reorganization Plan Number 6
In 1953» President Eisenhower established the Rocke-
feller Committee to study defense organization. As a result of
committee recommendations, Defense Department Reorganization
PI on Number 6 abolished the Munitions Board and transferred its
functions to the Secretary of Defense. The reorganization plan
Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 195
3
t
Public Law «2-L}.a«, b, 2d Gong., 66 Stat. 538, sec. 636, 1952.
lF.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Defense Supply Agency , H. Rept. 2l|i|0, 87th Cong.,
2d sess., 1962, p. 10.
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authorized the establishment of six new Assistant Secretaries of
Defense, including the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and
Logistics).
The Munitions Board, which had been responsible, among
other things, for the Defense Standardization Program, the
Military Cataloging Program, and for coordinating defense
procurement, had made little progress in integrating defense
materiel management
.
The Munitions Board, comprising representatives
of the three military services and a chairman with
limited discretion, never became an effective agency
for military supply integration. 2
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and
Logistics) notified the military departments in November, 1953
that the supply systems study project undertaken by the Munitions
Board was discontinued and that subsequent emphasis was to be
placed on supply management improvement "within the respective
servioes." The Alameda Medical Test was discontinued in accord-
ance with this pronouncement.
Thus, the emphasis shifted away from integrated
materiel management and away from congressional intent as
prescribed by the O'Mahoney amendment. This shift oocurred in
"Hj.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Background
Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply
,
8 6th Cong., 2d sess., I960, p. 39.
*TJ.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Defense Supply Agency . H. Rept. 2l[1^0, p. 9.
%.S. , Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Background
Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply
,
86th Conp;., 2d sess., I960, p. 39.
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spite of the fact that the report on the Alameda Medical Test,
which had been submitted to the Munitions Board in October, 1952,
had concluded that this limited approach to integrated materiel
management had been proven feasible and that economies could be
achieved through such integration by the elimination of
duplicated administrative and overhead costs.
Second Hoover Commission Recommendations
The second Hoover Commission report, issued in 1955*
strongly criticized the waste and duplication in military supply
systems end focused renewed attention to the lack of progress
toward integration of materiel management. The Commission
recommended that Congress enact legislation establishing a
separate civilian-managed agency, reporting to the Secretary of
p
Defense, to administer common supply and service activities.
It was further recommended that the agency be named the Defense
Supply and Service Administration.
There was unanimous opposition by the military services
and the Department of Defense to these Hoover Commission
^J.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Military Supply Management , H. Rept. 857, 83rd Cong.,
1st sess., p. 37.
*TJ.S., Committee on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Business Organization of the Department of
Defense
,







recommendations. The following are typical of the arguments
cited in opposition to the proposal:
1. The objectives of the Hoover Commission give
inadequate consideration to the mission and organization
of the armed services; overemphasizes peacetime
conditions; and assumes a lack of efficiency in
military logistic activities.
2. Deficiencies in the area of common-supply
and common-service activities have been recognized
by the Department of Defense and actions have been
taken to correct them.
3. The establishment of the agency would lead
to duplications in both overhead and operating personnel,
since two supply organizations would be required, one
for common items and the other for military peculiar
items. Moreover, civilians would be hired to perform
work now being accomplished by troops on practical
application training assignments and destined for
duty in the combat zone in wartime.
l±» The expandability of a common supply and
service agency in time of war would be much less
rapid than that of the armed services, since it would
not have access to personnel through the draft, does
not have reserve units available to it, and would
perhaps be subject to loss of men to the draft.
5. Retention of civilians in wartime on
military supply and service jobs is doubtful,
particularly under the threat of nuclear war.
6. Military effectiveness would be Jeopardized ,
because supply would become less responsive to command.
The Single Manager Plan
As a result of the Hoover Commission's recommendations
and continuing criticism by members of Congress concerning
failure to comply with the intent of the 'Mahoney amendment, the
Secretary of Defense established the single manager concept in
"hj.S. , Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Background
Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply
,
66th Cong., 2d sess. , I960, pp. 16-17.
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November, 1955. This concept, under which one military service
was given supply support responsibility for a particular
commodity or service to meet the requirements of all the military
services, constituted a reversal of the previously announaed
defense position which questioned the value of unification along
single manager lines.
The single manager plan, which incorporated many of the
concepts envisioned under the Hoover Commission's recommendations,
appears to have been essentially a compromise measure designed to
maintain military control of supply systems and to prevent the
formulation of the highly controversial "fourth service of supply.*
The compromise aspects of the plan were, perhaps, best summed up
by the House Committee on Government Operations, which postulated
that:
It balanced Congressional and Hoover Commission
demands for more integrated supply operations against
the preference of the military departments for
separate supply organizations and the prevailing
military doctrine that each department must control
its own supply channels for effective performance of
military missions.!
Under the single manager plan, military departmental
secretaries were designated as single managers and were assigned
total responsibility for the funding, procurement, inventory
management, storage, maintenance and distribution of all wholesale
"TJ.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Military Supply Management , Single Manager Agencies,
Hearings , 86th Cong. , 1st sess. , 1959, p. 11.
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stocks of commodities as assigned by the Secretary of Defense.
The departmental secretaries, in turn, established single manager
operating agencies to discharge their inventory management
responsibilities. The user military services maintained control
over requirements determination and retail distribution.
Initially, four single manager assignments were made in
what were, perhaps, the most obvious areas of commonality, i.e.,
subsistence, clothing and textiles, medical materiel and
petroleum products.
Logistics System Study Project
In 195>7> the Secretary of Defense ordered a critical
appraisal of all the principal arrangements for coordinating the
military supply and logistics systems in order "to develop the
ultimate plan of supply system organization, " The findings of
the Logistics System Study Project, issued in 1958* indicated
that the single manager plans constituted effective supply
management techniques. Although this study project was discon-
tinued before completing the development of the ultimate plan of
logistics organization, it was primarily responsible for the
establishment of the Armed Forces Supply Support Council and the
Armed Poroes Supply Support Center in 1958*
The Armed Forces Supply Support Center, a jointly
"iJ.S. , Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Background
Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and
Supply
,
tS6th Cong., 2d sess. , I960, pp. 101-3,
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staffed activity, was responsible to the Secretary of Defense
through the Armed Forces Supply Support Council, which was
composed of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Supply
and Logistics) as chairman, a principal military representative
appointed by each of the four services, and the Director of the
Armed Forces Supply Support Center. The following functions
were assigned to the center, as stated in its charter:
(a) Prepare and publish Federal catalog data
and insure conversion to the data by the military
supply systems.
(b) Recommend the assignment of responsibility
among the services for the monitorship and development
of specifications for certain categories of supplies.
(c) Develop and coordinate interservice
operations to assure cross--utilization of assets in
order to minimize procurement, stockage, and
transportation.
(d) Conduct specific study projects of the
operations of supply systems of the military services
and noncommercial common items of material to obtain
optimum integration in the interest of increased
military effectiveness and economy
.
McCormack Amendment
Notwithstanding the progress that had been made toward
the integration of military logistics functions, in 1958,
congressional pressures for greater unification and greater
economies resulted in passage of the McCormack-Curtis Amendment
to the Defense Reorganization Aot of that year. The language of
this amendment removed any lingering doubts with respect to the







Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines it
will be advantageous to the government in terms of
effectiveness, economy, or efficiency, he shall
provide for the oarrying out of any supply or service
activity common to more than one military department
by a single agency or such other organizational
entities as he deems appropriate.
!
Defense Materiel Management Improvement Program
With the pressure still on for greater integration in
the field of common supplies and services, in 1959 the Defense
Materiel Management Improvement Program was initiated. This
program, which consisted of a series of study projects
participated in by all the military services under the direction
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Logistics), was undertaken for the purpose of achieving further
integration of materiel management "without disruption of the
p
military supply systems."
In 1959 and I960, as a result of studies by the Armed
Forces Supply Support Center, four new commodity single manager
assignments were made at the direction of the Armed Forces Supply
Support Center. The new commodity areas so assigned were
industrial, construction, automotive and general supplies.
Motional Security Act of 19U7. as amended , sec.
202(c)(6), 5 USC 171a(c)(6).
nJ.S., Department of Defense, Integrated Management of
Common Supply Activities




As we shall see in Chapter III, the most significant
event in this evolutionary process was the establishment of the
Defense Supply Agency in 1961. The purpose of this chapter has
been to review the principle forces and events which contributed
to the evolution of integrated materiel management within the
Department of Defense prior to the study project which resulted
in the creation of the Defense Supply Agency. Space does not
permit discussion here of all integrating influences. However,
several important programs, including those involving cataloging,
standardization, and interservice utilization of assets, without
which little progress could have been made toward integration,
will be disoussed in later chapters.
The above review tends to cast the Congress into a
continuing role of advocate of ever increasing integration of
materiel management and the military services into a role of
opposition to such progress, the net result of which was slow
progress toward integration. The notion of deliberate foot-
dragging by the Defense Department is exemplified by the following
extract from a study prepared by members of the staff of the
Joint Economic Committee:
Various facets of supply management in Department
of Defense have been subjected to numerous studies since
the passage of the National Security Act in 191^7 •
Careful and objective studies are very useful and
necessary, but they should not be used as a substitute
for forthright and effective action. The record,
however, appears to indicate that studies have often
been utilized In Department of Defense solely for the
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purpose of postponing decisions.
There can be little doubt that opposition within the
military services to the concept of integrated materiel
management wes due, in part, to such factors as the natural
reluotance to change, the desire for retention of the status quo
and parochial fears of any proposals which would tend to "crumble
existing empires." However, lest we be too quick to criticize,
it must be remembered that there was, and still is, genuine
concern over the possible detrimental effects on combat readiness
which might result from the establishment of a civilian-
controlled "fourth service of supply." Therefore, any proposal
which bore the earmarks of a "fourth service" was automatically
opposed. It must also be remembered that time tends to erase
environmental influences. An objective analysis must recognize
thet there were fundamental communications, identification and
management barriers which inhibited more rapid progress toward
consolidation and integration of logistics functions. As data
processing technology advanced and new management and information
techniques were developed, these fundamental barriers began to
disappear, thereby paving the way for genuine progress toward
greater integration of materiel management.
"TJ.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Background
Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and bupply
,
86th Cong., 2d sess., I960, p. 106.

CHAPTER II
REQUISITES FOR EFFECTIVE INTEGRATED
MATERIEL MANAGEMENT
In order to provide a framework within which the Defense
Supply Agency's approach to integrated materiel management may
be discussed, this chapter sets forth certain requisites for
effective integrated materiel management. This is not intended
to be an all-inclusive discussion. Rather, it is intended to
focus attention on the more important requisites for the attain-
ment of maximum efficiency and effectiveness.
Materiel Management Defined
Materiel management is that phase of military logistics
which includes managing, cataloging, requirements determination,
procurement, distribution, overhaul and disposal of materiel.
The term materiel management is considered to be interchangeable
with the terms supply management and inventory control.
Tenets of Integrated Materiel Management
In an attempt to identify and isolate the tenets of
integrated materiel management, a search of the available
"^J.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of the United
States Military for Joint Usage
.





literature nowhere reveals so cogent a summation as that provided
by Captain Theodore B. Purvis, Jr., U.S. Navy:
Sound management requires weighing cost against
effectiveness. Trading off effectiveness and cost
applies not only to weapons systems, but to support
services and collateral functions as well.
Effectiveness in an integrated supply system
requires:
1. Specialization of personnel and equipment
in commodity management, procurement, distribution,
and technical services;
2. Uniform procedures and terminology among
and between the Military Services to facilitate
transmission and interpretation of information;
3. A distribution system that minimizes
delivery time to the ultimate user;
Ij.. Item standardization to promote
interchangeability, eliminate unnecessary duplication,
and optimize asset utilization;
5. Availability of assets to all users, with
recognition given to program and time priorities;
6. Streamlined disposal procedures to eliminate
unnecessary items, optimizing 3pace utilization and
management resources.
Economy in an integrated supply system requires:
1. Elimination of duplication in functions
between various levels to the greatest extent
practicable;
2. A streamlined distribution system to minimize
intransit inventories, stock layering, and materials
handling;
3. Sound methods for requirements determination,
based on complete and timely data;
J4.. Efficient procurement based on sound
requirements. 1
Direction and Control of Integrated Management
An integrated manager has an unusually complex task
"Theodore B. Purvis, Jr., "The Role of the Defense
Supply Agency in the Support of Military Programs and Weapons
Systems" (unpublished thesis, Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, 1961^), pp. 11-12.
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since he must be responsive to the needs of all the military
departments. Under the concept of integrated materiel management,
individual military services are necessarily divested of the
authority and responsibility for management of supplies and
services assigned to the integrated manager. This creates an
anomalous situation in that military commanders are responsible
for military operations and mission accomplishment, yet, they
have no direct control over a large portion of the resources
required to assure mission accomplishment.
If the integrated manager is to be responsive to the
diverse needs of the military services, top management attention
must be given to the integrated support system in order to ensure
that the integrated manager has the necessary resources and the
necessary policy guidance to carry out his task.
This suggests the requirement for a short direot chain
of command between the Secretary of Defense and the integrated
manager. However, there is no use pretending that a shortening
of the chain of command by itself produces significantly different
results than some other organizational scheme. The integrated
manager must still work closely with all levels of the military
departments to avoid arbitrary or unilateral decisions which
would be detrimental to effective supply support for one or more
military departments. In addition, the integrated manager must
work closely with the joint staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to ensure that supply support is in consonance with military
planning. However, the short chain of command is important

2k
because a large number of significant decisions must be brought
to the attention of the highest level of the Department of Defense
and decided on a uniform, rational and coherent basis.
Identification of Items Susceptible
of Integrated Management
It is necessary to have effective criteria and uniform
procedures for identification and assignment of susceptible
"common" supply items to an integrated materiel manager.
The first question which arises is, what are common
supplies? Technically speaking, common supplies are identical
items which are used by two or more services. Generally, the
only practical way to determine whether two items are identical
is by use of the Federal Stock Number, i.e., if the items have
the same stock number, they are identical.
Early in the history of integrated materiel management,
it was recognized that the potential benefits of integrated
management were not limited to those items which were "common"
in the strict sense of having identical stock numbers. Accord-
ingly, the term "common-use" items came into being when the
single manager plan was conceived, "Common-use" items were
defined as "a class or category of items, of commercial type,
largely non-technical in nature, generally used throughout the
military and civilian economies." The concept of "common-use"
"^J.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Defense Supply Agency , H. flept. 21^0, pp. tf0-8l.
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items under this definition is, perhaps, best understood by the
use of en example. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps
uniforms are distinctly different from each other. However, they
are considered to be "common-use" items because they are items
of clothing. Clothing is a class or category of items of
commercial type, largely non-technical in nature, generally used
throughout the military and civilian economies.
The "common-use" approach to assignment of items to
integrated management was adequate for the relatively simple
commodities involved in the four initial single manager
assignments: subsistence, clothing and textiles, medical supplies,
and petroleum products. These four assignments were made on the
basis of entire Federal Supply Groups and Classes, without
screening individual items in each class. However, as more
technical items such as industrial, automotive, construction and
general supplies were considered for assignment to integrated
management, it became apparent that there were some items in
these classes which, for various sound reasons, must be retained
for management by the individual services. Since the "common-use"
approach had become too restrictive, it was necessary to devise
criteria against which all items in the classes under
2
consideration could be screened.
Andrew T. McNamara, "The Defense Supply Agency"
(unpublished document, December 12, 1961), p. 27.
2Ibid ., pp. 27-28.
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To meet this need, Item Management Coding (IMC) criteria
were developed. These criteria permit screening by the military
services of all Federally stock numbered items in classes
assigned to the Defense Supply Agency for integrated management.
Items within the assigned classes which meet the exception
criteria may be retained for management by the services. Among
the most significant exception criteria are:
Major end items of equipment of unusual importance to
operating units; certain categories of repairable items; items
reauirlng approval for issue on a case-by-case basis because of
design or engineering considerations; items unstable in design;
items which require source control restrictions; non-commercial
weapon systems consumables not covered by adequate specifications;
items of special importance to the performance of military
missions.
The item management coding concept, under which the
criteria are susceptible to change in accordance with the
changing requirements of the military services, appears to afford
the services adequate flexibility in retention of items from
classes assigned to integrated management, thereby providing an
acceptable framework for making integrated management
assignments,
U.S. , Department of Defense, Item Management Coding
Manual, DOD J+lIiD. 26-M, July 1, 1965, pp. I l-II 11.
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Preservation of the Integrity of Military Departmental
Logistics Organizations and Capabilities
Logistical control must never be separated from
the responsibility of the combat commander,
1
The Project 100 Study was established by Secretary of
Defense McNamara in 1961 for the express purpose of providing
"the proper long-term blueprint for managing common supply and
p
service activities," The decision to establish the Defense
Supply Agency resulted from the report of the Project 100 Study
Committee, The committee, chaired by then General Counsel of the
Department of Defense Cyrus R. Vance and composed of the four
logistic assistant secretaries, endorsed five principles which
they felt should be observed in planning further integration of
common supply management. These principles appear to be equally
as valid today and for the future as they were when enunciated
in 1961:
1. Integrated supply management systems must be
suitable for wartime use without substantial change, and
must be fully responsive to combat needs of the operating
forces.
2. Each Service must retain full control over the
development and management of assigned weapon systems.
The process of selecting items to be managed by Single
Managers must be based upon criteria which permit the
Military Departments to retain under their own
management those items which are of critical importance
to the operation of assigned weapon systems.
1Ibid.
u,S. , Department of Defense, "Integrated Management of
Common Supply and Service Activities," memorandum from Robert S.
McNamara, Secretary of Defense, March 23, 1961.
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3. Each Military Service will continue to require
military personnel trained in supply and service
management to meet CONUS iContinental United StatesJ
retail and user requirements, overseas and mobilization
requirements, and the logistic support of that
Serviced assigned weapon systems,
ij.. The ownership and control of wholesale stocks
by Single Managers should continue to be restricted
to COHUS, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary
of Defense. This requires that the Services continue
to provide and maintain their own retail and overseas
distribution systems.
5. There needs to be a clear delineation between
the functions assigned to integrated managers and those
assigned to the military services. 1
The Project 100 Committee also recognized the direct
applicability of certain principles previously enunciated by the
plogistic chiefs of the four military services. Several are
pertinent to the maintenance of the integrity of military
departmental logistics capabilities.
The first of these principles is that each military
service must retain the authority and capability for requirements
determination. The integrated manager should be responsible for
computing requirements to meet system demand and should determine
net procurement requirements for all items under his management.
The rationale behind this principle is that requirements
"TJ.S., Department of Defense, Integrated Management of
Common Supply Activities
, pp. Ill if-III 5.
Interservice Agreement on Principles and Functional
Assignments in the Area of Common Supplies and Services , reprinted
as Appendix D to U.S. Department of Defense, Integrated Management
of Common Supply Activities .
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determination consists of determining those factors or programs
on which computation may be based as well as such item
determinations as may be involved in developing outfitting and
allowance lists and specific mobilization reserves.
Secondly, each military service must maintain its own
operationally sensitive distribution system sufficient to provide
tailored combat support. Since each service discharges its
assigned missions in essentially different combat postures, these
distribution systems must be oriented toward the peculiar
operational requirements of each service.
Finally, the military services must retain the
prerogative of selecting for service management those items of
supply which the individual service considers it must manage to
carry out its assigned mission. This is in keeping with the
principle that mission responsibility cannot be separated from
control over the vital means necessary to the accomplishment of
that mission.
Optimizing Responsiveness to Military Requirements
While Minimizing Costs
The term responsiveness, as used here, is defined as
effective and timely support to the military services. No




of supply effectiveness, for there is no single optimum level
for all commodities or for all circumstances. Even a comparison
of supply effectiveness of an integrated manager with that of
service managed items is of dubious value, for the supply-demand
basis on which most common, high turnover items are managed
melees the integrated manager's task far different and much less
difficult than the management of more technical materiel
1
remaining under service control. However, it is noted that the
supply effectiveness rates of each of the single manager
operating agencies had reached or exceeded 95 per cent prior to
the time these agencies were taken over by the Defense Supply
p
Agency. It would, therefore, seem that the integrated manager
should emphasize maintenance of these previously established
levels in order to prevent degradation of the supply support
posture.
Turning to the question of timely response, as
contrasted with supply effectiveness or stock availability, there
is a clear need for the integrated manager to be able to deliver
materiel to the military end-user in time to meet his requirements,
During the single manager era, it became obvious that the absence
of standardized requisitioning, issue and priority systems was
jeopardizing the ability of the single manager operating agencies
to support the other military services in a timely manner.
Oscar N. Dale, "Integrated Materiel Management
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow" (unpublished thesis, Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, 1967), p. 91.
2U.S., Department of Defense, Integrated Management of
Common Supply Activities
, p. II 3.
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Furthermore the dissimilar systems and documentation of the
services were impeding the progress of mechanization and
automation*
As a result of these difficulties, the Department of
Defense developed and implemented the Military Standard
Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) and the Uniform
Movement and Materiel Issue Priority System (UMMIPS) in 1962.
As their names imply, these systems provide uniform procedures
for the requisitioning and issue of materiel throughout the
Defense Department and a standard method of designating the
priority of a requisition, based on military essentiality. In
addition, UMMIPS provides standard time frames for the issue
and shipment of materiel, based on assigned priorities.
These standardized procedures provide the framework for
timely response by the integrated manager. To assure timely
support within this framework, there is a clear need for a
streamlined, efficient wholesale distribution system.
How, then, can integrated materiel management minimize
costs while maximizing responsiveness to military requirements.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric answered this
question by enumerating the following list of cost reduction
benefits expected to result from the creation of the Defense
Supply Agency:
Greater efficiency through uniform direction and
control.
1Ibid., p. Ill 2.
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Uniform implementation of policies of the
Secretary of Defense concerning management of common
supplies.
Reduction of workload for requisitioned,
inventory managers, and supply points through
standardized procedures, systems, and organization.
Increased supply responsiveness and reduced
warehousing and transportation costs through
streamlined and consolidated distribution.
An increase in the rate of standardization
of items.
Greater economies and faster adjustments to
change through a reduction in decision making time
because of the elimination of multiple channels
and layers of management.
Greater flexibility and simplification in
programing, budgeting, and funding, through the
consolidation of resources.
Reduced overlapping and duplication through
consolidation of common facilities and functions,
thereby reducing overhead costs*
Improved utilization of total assets in the
Department of Defense with corresponding reductions
in inventory investments.
Better merchandising in the disposal of surplus
personal property.
Continuation of the increased utilization of the
General Services Administration by the Department of
-,
Defense, and increased uniformity in such utilization.
The Distribution System
As has already been suggested, the integrated manager's
distribution system is a key element in assuring timely response
to military service requirements. The distribution system
plays an even more important role in assuring increased efficiency
of operation.
With respect to efficiency of operation it is considered
HJ.S.
,
Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Defense Supply Agency, Hearings , before a subcommittee
of the Committee on Government Operations, House of
Representatives, 87th Cong., 2d seas,, 1962, p. 66.
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thet the objective of the wholesale distribution system is to
minimize cross-hauling and back-hauling and to position stocks to
best advantage close to areas of military concentration and ports
of embarkation.
However, this is a difficult objective to reach. It
requires a careful study of all customer activities and raises
a multitude of questions. Who are the customers? Where are
they located? What are thir missions? What is their volume of
consumption of the various commodities? What are the
transportation alternatives? The answere to these and a myriad
of other difficult questions must be found in order to construct
the optimally efficient distribution system.
Although the single manager approach to integrated
materiel management resulted in a significant increase in overall
p
efficiency of operation, the single manager distribution
systems left much to be desired. Even though the single managers
attempted to arrange warehousing and distribution patterns to
meet the needs of all defense customers in the most economical
manner, there was a natural tendency to build these systems on
the existing facilities of the individual bureaus or technical
This was the objective of the Defense Supply Agency
when establishing its wholesale distribution system; see U.S.
,
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Background Material on
Economy in Government-1967 , 90th Cong. , 1st sess. , 1967, p. 153^
p
As of December yi, I960, annual savings at the rate of
$?0 million per year and one-time savings of over $500 million
had been identified; see U.S., Department of Defense, Integrated
Management of Common Supply Activities , p. II 3.
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services of the parent military deparaent. This resulted in
the creation of a multiplicity of distribution systems for
common supplies.
With this experience in mind, it becomes obvious that
the goal of truly efficient distribution systems can best be
reached through the unity of command inherent in the single
agency approach to integrated materiel management.
Procedural Uniformity
Procedural uniformity in such areas as requisitioning,
billing, reimbursement, pricing, cataloging, provisioning,
transportation and movement and other types of reporting and
accounting procedures, is an obvious requisite of effective
integrated materiel management. It is suggested that procedural
uniformity can best be attained through the influence of the
single agency integrated manager. Under the single manager
approach, there was no real incentive to standardize procedures.
As in the case of distribution systems, the single manager was
motivated to utilize the procedures of his parent military
2department.
The single agency integrated manager is the natural
leader for the development and implementation of standardized
1Ibid.
, p. Ill k.
p
As of the date of the Projeot 100 study report,
sixteen different requisitioning and documentation systems had
been Identified throughout the Department of Defense; see U.S.,
Department of Defense, Integrated Management of Common Supply
Activities, p. Ill ?.
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procedures, for he is motivated to take maximum advantage of
increased efficiency and effectiveness through automation. He
cannot hope to accomplish this while dealing with a multiplicity
of differing procedures.
Communications Routing Procedures
Ideally, military service customer activities should
have a single point to which all requisitions submitted to
integrated materiel managers may be addressed. Under this
concept, the customer's task is greatly simplified.
However, this approach raises several basic questions.
Whet are the consequences of interposition of an activity having
only a communication function between the user and the responsible
supply manager? A test of this concept during implementation
of the DSA distribution system was not wholly conclusive.
However, military service opposition arose because of the
interposition of this extra link in the communications chain.
The second basic question involves the role of the routing center.
Should it be considered as purely a communications link with no
supply management functions or should it perform supply related
functions such as furnishing status information on requisitions
or re-routing requisitions to depots in the event that one or
more inventory control points is incapacitated under emergency
or wartime conditions?
"4j.S., Defense Supply Agency, Major Areas of Effort or
Inquiry. Fiscal Year 1966 , p. 15.
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These and other related questions were under
consideration for several years before the decision was made to
implement the Defense Automatic Addressing System (DAAS) in
1968.
The deoision was made in favor of a defense-wide
system under the operational control of DSA. The computerized
system, which utilizes the Defense Automatic Digital Network
(AUTODIH), essentially provides a communications routing
capability but has certain additional capabilities including
the ability to reply to item source of supply interrogations
from authorized activities.
"TJ.S., Department of Defense, Defense Automatic
Addressing System , Draft Manual DOD [pi^O. 29M, 1965, pp. 1 1-3 10.

CHAPTER III
ESTABLISHMENT OP THE DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY
By early 1961, eight commodity areas had been brought
under the single manager plan. The single manager agencies
for clothing and textiles, subsistence, medical and petroleum
supplies were well established. Although the assignments for
general, industrial, automotive and construction materiel had
been made, the single manager agencies for these commodities
were not yet fully operational. Under consideration for
assignment to single management were electrical and electronic
supplies and listed as possible future assignments were
industrial production equipment, chemical supplies and aviation
materiel.
The single manager approach to integrated management
of common supplies was gaining momentum, and it appeared to
many observers that single manager assignments to the military
departments constituted the blueprint for the future. Then, in
1961, the Armed Forces Supply Support Center issued a report
on a study project undertaken in the previous year to recommend
courses of action to provide for the optimum arrangement for
management of electrical and eleotronios materiel within the
"U.S., Department of Defense, Integrated Management of




Defense Department. This report included the recommendation that
the Secretary of Defense establish a Defense Electronics
Management Center for the integrated materiel management of
electrical and electronic equipment components and electrical
wire and cable. The report further recommended that this be a
joint center under the authority, direction and control of the
Secretary of Defense, exercised through the Armed Forces Supply
Support Council.
Pro.lect 100
The newly appointed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
armed with the specific authorization of the McCormack amendment
to adopt the most appropriate means of integration of supply
2
and service activities, faced the question of the future of
integrated materiel management in an environment partially
created by the controversial recommendation of the Armed Forces
Supply Support Center. On March 23, 1961, some two months after
taking the reins of the Defense Department, Secretary McNamara
established Project 100 to determine the optimal approach. He
stated that he considered "continued sound progress in the
integration of common supply and service activities to be one
of our primary means of achieving substantial improvement and
economy in logistics management during the next four years. "^
^bld . . p. I k»
Above, pp. 17-18.
%.S., Department of Defense, "Integrated Management of




McNamara directed completion of the project by July 1,
1961 and limited the scope of the study by calling for three
alternative plans of organization and management of common
supply and service activities.
The study report was not to reach a final conclusion
but was to include a comprehensive statement of the advantages
and disadvantages of each of the three alternatives. The three
plans specified for study were:
Plan No. 1 - A plan based on continuation of the
principle of assigning single manager responsibilities
to the individual Military Departments. This plan
will indicate how the Electronics Materiel Management
Agency would best be established under one of the
Military Departments, indicate possible future single
manager assignments, and recommend desirable revisions
in the present assignment, organization and operation
of single managers.
Flan Mo. 2 - A plan of organization and operation
for a consolidated common supply and service agency to
be assigned to the Secretary of one of the Military
Departments. This plan should depict in depth the
organization and method of staffing of such an Agency,
its relationships with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the headquarters of the Military Departments,
the Bureaus, Technical Services and Commands, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified and Specified
Commands. It should also describe any changes in the
status and mission of the Supply Corps, the Quarter-
master Corps, and the Air Force Logistics Command
which would result from this form of organization.
The proposed Agency should include the Electronics
Materiel Management Agency and the functions now
assigned to the Armed Forces Supply Support Center.
Plan No. 3 - This plan will present the same type
and scope of organization as that outlined in Plan
No. 2 but provide for its establishment as an Agency
reporting to the Secretary of Defense. The report on
Plan No. 3 should consider the advantages and dis-
advantages of having such an Agency report (1) through
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (having the same status as
the Defense Communications Agency) as one alternative,
and (2) through another designee of the Secretary of

Defense, as a second alternative.
Evaluation of the three plans was based on nine key
criteria which the study committee felt should be applied in
designing a long term blueprint for integrated materiel
management i
1. Continued sound progress in integrated
management
•
2. Assure proper secretariel direction and
control of integrated management.
3. Operation of the military logistics support
system is a military function.
1+. Obtain greater procedural uniformity.
5>. Improve funding and accounting systems.
6. Strengthen and expand existing cataloging,
standardization and utilization programs.
7. Make more effective use of common supply
and service activities.
8. Establish more efficient distribution systems.
9. Preserve the integrity of departmental logistic
organizations.
2
The above criteria appear to have played an important
role in the final decision by Secretary McNamara to establish
the Defense Supply Agency. In discussing the rationale behind
this decision, Deputy Seoretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric
drew attention to the problems caused by lack of procedural
uniformity among the single manager operating agencies. Other
important problems which he associated with continuation and
expansion of the single manager concept included the lack of
1Ibid.
^.S. , Department of Defense, Integrated Management of
Common Supply Activities , pp. Ill l-III 5.

flexibility in the use of funds, inability to ascertain true
operating costs, and duplication and overlap which was inherent
in the separate distribution systems of the single manager
1
operating agencies.
The decision to establish the Defense Supply Agency
was based on the belief that the progress made during the single
manager era could best be improved upon through uniform
procedures, improved distribution, more rapid standardization,
better utilization of assets, and more efficient disposal
operations, and that these objectives could best be attained by
consolidating single manager activities in one cohesive,
integrated agency under one head reporting directly to the
2Secretary of Defense.
Accordingly, Secretary McNamara authorized the
establishment of the Defense Supply Agency on September 12, 1961,
some two months after he had received the report of the Project
100 Study Committee. The DSA charter was issued on November 6,
1961 and the agency became operational on January 1, 1962.^"
Mission and Responsibilities
The mission of DSA is to provide "the most effective
iJ.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Defense Supply Agency, Hearings , p. 59.
2Ibid.
, pp. 59-60.
-fa.S., Department of Defense, Defense Supply Agenoy
(DSA) , Directive Number 5105.22.
*TJ.S., Defense Supply Agency, An Introduction to the
Defense Supply Agency , (Washington, D.C." Government Printing
Office, October, 1962), p. iii.
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and economical support of common supplies and services to the
military departments and other DOD components." This mission
comprises two basic responsibilities. The first is the
management, control, and distribution, at the wholesale level, of
assigned materiel commodities and items of supply. The second is
the administration and management of designated Department of
Defense logistics services and programs.
In order to accomplish this mission and to become
operational at the earliest practicable date, DSA absorbed
several "going concern" activities including the Armed Forces
Supply Support Center, the eight existing single manager agencies,
the Military Traffic Management Agency and two existing
2
organizations concerned with disposal of surplus property.
The scope of DSA's responsibilities at the time of the
agency's establishment was described by the first DSA Director
as follows:
- Take over all the Supply Single Manager
Operating Agencies, previously under the
Secretaries of the Army and Navy.
- Take over the Military Traffic Management
Agency, previously under the Secretary of the
Army;
- Take over the Armed Forces Supply Support
Center with responsibility for the Federal
Catalog Program and its oentralized cataloging
operations, the Defense Standardization Program,
the various programs for interservice utilization
of assets, and the screening of excess.
"TJ.S., Department of Defense, Defense Supply Agency
(DSA) , Directive Number 5105.2?.
p
Ibid. , Enclosure 1.
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- Take over the thirty-four consolidated Surplus
Sales Offices formerly operated by the three military
departments;
- Take over the National Surplus Property Bidders
Control Center;
- Administer the Surplus Property Disposal Program;
- Administer the Coordinated Procurement Program;
- Fund and operate its own distribution system;
- Take over the management of electrical and
electronic supplies now managed separately by each
of the military departments, creating an operating
agency similar to the Single Manager Operating Agencies;
- Pursue studies to determine the feasibility of
integrating the management of Industrial Production
Equipment, Chemical Supplies, and Aeronautical Spare
Parts; and
- Cause systems analysis and design to continue
to improve integrated supply management.
1
Relationships and Control
The Project 100 Committee considered and rejected the
advisability of placing the Defense Supply Agency under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
concurred in this view with an indication that the Joint Chiefs
"5
did not wish to become involved in supply policy matters.
With respect to the adoption of the single agency
alternative, the Project 100 Committee recommended the
establishment of a Defense Supply Council composed of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense as chairman, the secretaries of the three
PP. 7-9.
Andrew T. McNamara, "The Defense Supply Agency,"
nj.S., Department of Defense, Integrated Management of
Common Supply Activities , p. VTI 1.
%.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Integrated Management of
Common Supply and Service Activities (DOD Project 100),"
memorandum from General L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, June 1, 1961.
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military departments, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Logistics). Under this proposal, DSA would
have reported to the Secretary of Defense through the Defense
Supply Council, which would have been responsible for policy
direction and guidance to DSA. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff objected to this arrangement with an expression of concern
that the proposed agency, responsible to this council, would not
be as responsive to the operating forces as were the single
manager agencies.
Secretary McNamara rejected the proposal to place the
Defense Supply Council in the chain of command and provided a
direct chain of command from the Secretary of Defense to the
Director, DSA. However, the Defense Supply Council was
established to "advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in the
direction and control of DSA." In addition to membership
recommended by the Project 100 Committee, the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff was assigned as a principal member of the
council.
As a practical matter, DSA is subject to the
supervision of the various organizational elements of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense which exercise policy direction and
control on behalf of the Secretary. Since the Office of the
HJ.S., Department of Defense, Integrated Management of
Common Supply Activities
, p. VII 2.
U.S. , Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Integrated Management of
Common Supply and Service Activities (DOD Project 100) .
"
-1J.S., Department of Defense, Defense Supply Agency
(DSA) , Directive Number £105.22.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) is
the office of primary interest on the majority of DSA activities,
the agency looks to that office, primarily, for policy guidance
and assistance. In practice, there is a very close working
relationship on policy matters between the office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) and
1Headquarters, DSA.
In addition to the role of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff as a member of the Defense Supply Council, arrangements
are in effect for regular coordination and review between DSA
and the Joint Staff with respect to the peacetime, war and
emergency plans, priorities and programs of the Joint Chiefs.
DSA representatives are given periodic briefings by the Joint
Staff on logistics implications of current strategic, tactical,
2
contingency and emergency plans.
There is extensive consultation and coordination
between DSA and the military departments at both the headquarters
and field levels. The DSA charter provides for "free and direct
aocess to and communications with all elements of the DOD and
other executive departments and agencies as necessary.'
It is DSA policy to avoid unilateral or arbitrary
action in matters concerning effective supply support of the
"TJ.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Defense Supply Agency , Hearings, p. 186.
2Ibid.
%.S., Department of Defense, Defense Supply Agency
(DSA) , Directive Number 5105.22.

military departments. The successful accomplishment of DSA's
mission is dependent upon adequate information concerning
developments within each of the military departments. DSA
actively seeks the advice and assistance of the military depart-
ments in order to keep abreast of military requirements and
changing support situations. Joint staffing of DSA is a key
factor in maintaining close liaison with the military
departments.
With respect to internal relationships, the chain of
command runs from the Director, DSA to the commander of each
field activity. The management concept enunciated by the first
Director of DSA, Lieutenant General Andrew T. McNamara, IT. S.
Army, provided for decentralization of operations and firm
central control of the DSA entity as a whole:
I want to follow the principle of decentralization
of operations. I want to put as much responsibility
and authority as I can in the hands of field commanders
within their areas of interest. I want to spend as little
time as possible on operational matters. I want to
look to my field commanders for prompt decisions and
results in the supply or service areas assigned to
them. Through this kind of reliance on field commanders,
I expect to be able to concentrate my efforts on over-
all direction, broad planning, and improved systems
and operations. But I intend that DSA shall be one
agency, not a loose federation of semi-autonomous
separate activities. I intend to eliminate overlapping
or duplication wherever I find it; to have uniformity
in organization, procedures, and practices wherever
it will increase our efficiency; and to exercise firm
central control of DSA as a whole.
2
"TT.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Defense Supply Agency, Hearings
, pp. 186-87.




Upon appointment of General McNamara, the Secretary
of Defense established two primary objectives for DSA:
First, to insure effective and timely support
of the military services in time of mobilization,
war, or other national emergency, as well as in
peacetime; Second, to furnish this support at the
lowest feasible cost.
General McNamara later indicated that the order in
which these objectives were established "is not accidental. It
reflects the priority which governs all DSA programs. This
priority and these objectives also govern the criteria against
which DSA»s achievements will be measured."
Modification of the Logistics Environment
The establishment of DSA impacted heavily on the defense
logistics environment. It consolidated within a single agency
the services' wholesale logistics responsibilities involving
common supplies. Each service, then, retained the responsibility
for all other logistics functions involving these common supplies
and all logistics functions relating to all other items. The
military services retained retail logistics functions for all
items as well as the responsibility for procurement and
management of major end items and weapon peculiar items.
"1J.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Background
Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply
,
tibth Cong., 1st sess., March 1963, p. 5I4..
2Ibid.
^R. Piekarz, The DSA and Military Logistics
.
(Santa
Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, November 1962), p. 8.
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Consequently, it was necessary to change the structure
and relationships of military materiel support to establish a
mechanism which permits effective interaction between the
military services and DSA; to obtain an effective and efficient
DSA management system; and to adjust service materiel support
organization to the modified logistics environment.
Since wholesale logistics activities are not ends in
themselves, they must be performed in conjunction with activities
of the user organizations. Wholesale inventories are procured
and stored to meet demands over some time period. In order to
stock the proper items in adequate quantities, the wholesale
inventory manager must be informed of the consumers' decisions
about the types and quantities of items they expect to use.
Conversely, the performance of service logistics and military
operations is partially dependent on the decisions of the
wholesale inventory manager. For example, the performance of
military equipment is partially dependent on the quality of the
common supplies purchased by the wholesale agency. To assure
items of satisfactory quality, the user organizations must
communicate information to the wholesaler concerning the quality
2they desire.
The establishment of DSA did not require a completely






with the military services. Rather, DSA was able to build upon,
restructure and standardize the network which had begun to take
form under the single manager system.

CHAPTER IV
THE DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY: THE PRINCIPLE
ORGANIZATION IN INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT
The Defense Supply Agency has grown, matured, and has
become an effective member of the defense establishment. In
January, 1962, DSA assumed management responsibility for some
87,000 items with an inventory value of more than 1.58 billion
dollars. By the end of fiscal year 1968, the number of items
centrally managed (excluding items designated for local purchase)
approximated 1,72 million, with an inventory value of about
2.81j. billion dollars. Of interest in these statistics is the
relatively small increase in the value of inventory. This is
certainly one indicator of the efficiency inherent in the
integrated materiel management concept. Table 1 illustrates
certain selected key indicators of the growth of DSA.
How, then, have these savings in inventory investment
been accomplished? During the period 1962 through 1965, DSA
effected a net reduction of investment in inventory by issuing
stocks in long supply without replacement. This can be viewed
"4j.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Military Supply Systems, hearings , before a sub-
committee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of
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as a one-time savings since the long supply situations had been
generated by the capitalization of wholesale stocks from the
military services. In fiscal years 1966 and 1967, the net
investment trend reversed as DSA built up the stock position
to support the increased demand generated from the Vietnam War.
The net investment reduction in fiscal year 1968 resulted from
the leveling off of Southeast Asia demand, an improvement in
industrial production capability and the drawdown of additional
stock recently assigned to DSA for integrated management.
The increase in personnel has proceeded in phase with
the assumption of additional management responsibilities. The
relatively large increase reflected in the fiscal year 1966
statistics primarily represents the assumption of contract
administration service functions, the largest single addition
p
to DSA's mpnagement task.
Changes in PSA's Operation and Mission
The more significant activations and transfers of
responsibilities to and from DSA and changes in DSA's mission
•a
assignment since its inception are indicated below:-7
January 1, 1962—DSA assumed command of and redesig-
nated Construction, Clothing and Textile, Subsistence and Traffic
1Ibid .
2Ibid
. . pp. 316-17.
%.S # , Defense Supply Agency, "Chronology of the Defense
Supply Agency," December, 1966.
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Management Agencie3 from the Army; Medical and Petroleum Agencies
from the Navy; Armed Forces Supply Center from the Department
of Defense; and various disposal and surplus property offices
from all the services.
April 1, 196?—DSA assumed command of Military
Industrial Supply Agency from the Navy (redesignated as Defense
Industrial Supply Center)
•
May 1, 1962—Army and Marine Corps clothing factories
were transferred to DSA (under command of Defense Clothing and
Textile Supply Center)
.
July 1, 1962—Defense Electronics Supply Center was
established (new activity with assets capitalized from all
services). DSA assumed command of Military Automotive Supply
Center from Army (redesignated as Defense Automotive Supply
Center)
•
August 15, 1962—Defense Surplus Bidders Control Office
was disestablished. Functions were assumed by Defense Logistics
Services Center (formerly Armed Forces Supply Support Center).
December 7, 196?—DSA Distribution System Plan was
approved by the Secretary of Defense, with certain modifications.
January. 1, 1963—DSA assumed oommand of Columbus Army
Depot, Tracy Annex of Sharpe Army Depot and Naval Supply Depot,
Mechanic sburg. (These transfers were in support of the DSA
Distribution System plan.)
March 1, 1963—Defense Industrial Plant Equipment
Center was established in Memphis, Tennessee (new activity).

September 28, I963--DSA was designated as Department of
Defense fooal point to monitor all Department of Defense use of
General Services Administration procurement and supply services.
November 1, 1963—DSA assumed command of Defense
Documentation Center for Scientific and Technical Information
from the Air Force.
January 1, 1961j.—-Defense Automotive Supply Center was
disestablished. DSA retained and transferred a portion of its
mission to the Defense Construction Supply Center. The remainder
of its mission was transferred to the Army.
January 1, 1961;—DSA assumed command of Memphis Army
Depot and Utah Army Depot. This completed the implementation of
the DSA Distribution System.
March 1, 1961j.—Special Purchases Offices were
established at Brooklyn, New York and Alameda, California to
support Army overseas forces with DSA decentralized and non-
catalogued items.
June 12, 1961j.—-Department of Defense Standardization
Program was transferred from DSA to the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics),
September 1961| to December 1965—Eleven Defense
Contract Administration Services Regions were established as
primary level field activities of DSA. (Personnel and offices
were transferred from all the services.)
February 15, 1965—Defense Traffic Management Service
was transferred from DSA to the Army.

*5?
July 1, 1965—Defense Personnel Support Center was
established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to replace the former
Clothing, Subsistence and Medical Supply Centers, all dis-
established during the month.
January 7, 1966—DSA Special Purchase Offices were
disestablished. DSA supply centers assumed complete overseas
support of decentralized and non-cataloged items for Army and
Air Force (except for Air Force activities in Pacific area).
January 1, 1967—DSA supply centers assumed overseas
support of decentralized and non-cataloged items for Air Force
in the Pacific Area.
In addition to the above, there have been numerous
transfers of management responsibility for categories of materiel
to and from DSA, Including several transfers from DSA to the
General Services Administration. Other new mission assignments
include the designation of DSA as focal point for supervision
and coordination of modifications to certain newly implemented
Department of Defense systems and procedures. These include
Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP),
Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures
(MILSTAMP), Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting
Procedures (MILSTRAP), and Military Standard Contract
Administration Procedures (MILSCAP). 1




flexible organization, taking on new management tasks, trans-
ferring some functions back to the military services and other
defense components and cnanging organizational structure to
accommodate changes in mission requirements and/or to increase
efficiency of operations.
Of some interest are a number of new mission
responsibilities such as the Defense Documentation Center and
Defense Contract Administration Services which are not directly
related to DSA's primary function, that of integrated materiel
menegement. One can speculate that functions of this type were
transferred to DSA as a matter of convenience or expediency.
However, for whatever reason DSA was called upon to perform these
unrelated functions, no further treatment will be given to them
here, for they are beyond the scope of this paper.
,
Of great interest here is the one materiel management
funotlon performed by DSA which the writer considers to be
inconsistent with the concept of integrated materiel management
at the wholesale level. This is the responsibility which DSA
has assumed for overseas support of decentralized and non-
cataloged items for the Army and Air Force. Notably absent from
participation in this program is the Navy and Marine Corps.
This program, which is called SPUR, an acronym for
special purchases, is essentially a procurement program, although




stockage of some of these items is undertaken under established
criteria after a certain number of requisitions are receired for
a given item. However, by the very nature of decentralized and
non-cataloged items, the great majority of such items do not
lend themselves to wholesale supply management concepts.
To illustrate this point, decentralized items are
defined as "those items for which the cognizant ICP of a Military
Department or the DSA has prescribed local management and
procurement by bases, posts, camps and stations and other DOD
activities, or fabrication by organizational and intermediate
maintenance activities. ..." Although this definition does not
satisfactorily describe the oriteria under which a management
decision may be made to decentralize an item, the implication is
that the criteria includes a combination of factors relating to
the repairability of the item, the dollar value of the item and
demand frequency. The decentralization of an item connotes one
or more characteristics including low dollar value, low demand
frequency and commercial availability, normally on an "off the
shelf" basis, or alternatively, relatively simple fabrication by
2
maintenance activities.
Non-cataloged items are defined as:
. . .
.items procured on a one-time basis for
immediate consumption, items procured for research and
1
U.S., Department of Defense, Supply Management Review
Program. Planning Report , October, 1965, pp. 07-60".
U.S., Department of Defense, Supply Management




development purposes, items obtained through oversea
procurement end intended solely for oversea use, items
procured with non-appropriated funds, items for which
centralized supply system control is not feasible,
and certain forms, charts, manuals or books.
1
These items do not lend themselves to wholesale
integrated materiel management concepts. For the most part, the
requirements consist of low-dollar value one-time buys. Yet,
DSA, which i3 organized for and oriented toward integrated
management at the wholesale level has taken on this major
responsibility.
To illustrate the magnitude of the program, during the
most recent seven month period (July 1968 through January 1969)
for which statistics are available, SPUR requirements accounted
for 212,255 of a total of 613, 991 2 DSA line item procurement
awards or approximately 3U P©r cent of the total.
The greatest impact of the SPUR program has been on the
Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC). For example, during
this same seven month period, 83,607 of a total of 230,231 line
item procurements awarded by DCSC were for SPUR requirements.




This total excludes procurements of fuel and
subsistence items. These commodities are not involved in the
SPUR program.
-%.S., Defense Supply Agency, Key Management Data,
Procurement and Production Directorate , February 25, 1969,
pp. 1-5.
^Ibid .




account for a substantial portion, has been a particularly
troublesome problem area at DGSG. This problem was highlighted
by revelation of instances of gross overpricing by suppliers
on small purchaes at DGSC by Congressman Pike, prior to and
during congressional hearings on the subject in 1967. Subsequent
investigation of the problem by DSA revealed that one of the
primary causes of overpricing was the absence or inadequacy of
descriptive data and item identification required to make
determinations of price reasonableness or even to identify the
basic characteristics of the items being procured.
The subject of inadequate technical data deserves
treatment in depth, but such treatment is beyond the scope of
this paper. For these purposes, it is sufficient to have
identified the problem and to have pointed out the direct
relationship between difficulties due to inadequate technical
data within DSA, the large volume of DSA ' s small purchase actions
8nd DSA's responsibility for overseas support of non-cataloged
and decentralized items, a mission which i3 incongruous with the
basic mission of DSA.
The Current Structure of DSA (^
DSA has made considerable progress in terms of reduoing
and consolidating activities with a view toward improved
efficiency in support of the military services. Among the more
"TJ.S., Defense Supply Agency, Briefing Prepared for




notable of these accomplishments is reduction of the number of
Defense Supply Centers (inventory control points) by dis-
establishment of the Defense Medical Supply Center and the Defense
Subsistence Supply Center and consolidation of the management
functions for these commodities with clothing and textiles into
the Defense Personnel Support Center in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania; consolidation of the former Army and Marine Corps
clothing factories; reduction of the number of activities storing
DSA managed materiel from seventy seven to twenty one; reduction
of the number of consolidated surplus sales offices from thirty
four to ten; and reduction of the number of subsistence regional
headquarters from ten to eight.
As a result of organizational adjustments such as these,
the DSA field organization now consists of twenty five primary
2level field activities. There are six Defense Supply Centers:
Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC), Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC), Alexandria,
Virginia; Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus,
Ohio; Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC), Dayton, Ohio;
and Defense General Supply Center (DGSC), Richmond, Virginia.
"TJ.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Military Supply Systems, hearings
, p. 217.
'TJ.S., Defense Supply Agency, An Introduction to the
pply Agency (W
Office, 1969), pp. 3-J4 2
.




The Defense Supply Centers, except DPSC which has a
procurement responsibility only, operate as inventory control
points end pre responsible for materiel management of assigned
commodities.
Pour DSA activities are classified as Defense Depots.
These are Defense Depot Meohanicsburg, Pennsylvania; Defense
Depot Memphis, Tennessee; Defense Depot Ogden, Utah; and Defense
Depot Tracy, California. In addition, four Defense Supply
Centers, DCSC, DGSC, DPSC and DESC, perform depot functions. The
Defense Depots are responsible for receipt, storage and issue of
materiel as directed by the Defense Supply Center having materiel
management responsibility for the items involved.
Pour activities are categorized as service centers.
These ere Defense Logistics Services Center, Defense Industrial
Plpnt Equipment Center, Defense Documentation Center and the
DSA Administrative Support Center.
Finally, there are eleven Defense Contract Administra-
tion Services Regions (DCASRs) which provide such services to
all requiring Department of Defense components, the National
Aeronautical and Space Administration, other federal and state
agencies and foreign governments.
DSA has continued support to the military services with-
out interruption during periods of major organizational change.
This has involved the extension of centra] control over a group
of heterogeneous agencies and the development of uniform policy,
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standards end procedures. Reorganization, consolidation of
functions, closing of redundant activities, better utilization
of facilities (including improved use of automatic data
processing equipment), and other actions aimed at increased
operating economies have reduced operating costs to the point
that annual savings in the cost of operation of DSA are estimated
at about 59 million dollars.
Division of Responsibilities for DSA Managed Items
Under the principal that the user of military equipment
and supplies should be responsible for the establishment of
qualitative requirements, the military services have retained
the responsibility for research, development, test and evaluation,
specifications, standards, purchase descriptions, and qualitative
requirements in general for items managed by DSA. It seems
convenient then to establish a simple division of responsibility
by the assertion that the services have the responsibility for
the "technical" aspects of DSA materiel and that DSA has the
"supply management" responsibility with all which that entails.
However, the simplicity of this division of
responsibility is somewhat misleading. For example, DSA has
certain "serai-technical" responsibilities under the Defense
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government




Standardization Program. The purpose of this program is to
eliminate overlapping of items and reduce the number of sizes
2
and kinds of items that are generally similar.
Although DSA's authority to make standardization
decisions on items for which it has management responsibility is
based on the principal of coordination and. prior agreement with
user military services, the Director of DSA is authorized to
make decisions where agreement cannot be reached, subject to the
right of appeal to the office of the Secretary of Defense by
the dissenting military departments. This policy concerning the
authority for and enforcement of standardization decisions was
made shortly after DSA was activated:
In the exercise of its standardization authority
with respect to items under its management, DSA will
seek the views of the military departments and seek
to obtain agreements among them, particularly with
respect to questions in the technical-engineering
area. However, if agreement cannot be reached, the
Director of DSA will make the decision subject to
As of the end of fiscal year 1968, DSA had
standardization management responsibility for approximately
2.1± million items, or some 62 per cent of the 3.9 million
Department of Defense items in the Federal Supply System, As
of that date, DSA had reviewed a total of 1,567,926 items with
a view toward standardization. As a result, 508,0?8 items
were deleted from the supply system; see U.S., Congress, House,
Committee on Government Operations, Military Supply Systems
,
Hearings
, pp. 223, 320-21.
TJ.S., Department of Defense, Standardization, Polioies.
Procedures and Instructions , Defense Standardization Manual




the right of appeal by the military department;
the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 1
However, in view of the DSA policy to avoid unilateral
or arbitrary action in matters concerning supply support of the
military services, this question of DSA's authority to force the
acceptance of standardization decisions becomes somewhat
p
academic. It is obvious that the real value of the standard-
ization program lies in areas where agreement can be readily
reached.
In addition to this standardization authority, DSA
influences the updating and necessary changes to specifications
for DSA managed materiel by review and referral of recommendations
to responsible military service specification preparing
activities. In this respect, the trend within the Department of
Defense appears to be toward increased use of performance
specifications rather than more detailed item specifications.
Under this changing concept, DSA can be expected to play a larger
"technical" role in interpreting and applying performance
specifications, even though the specifications will continue to
be determined by the user military services.
DSA has a responsibility under its charter to "recommend
research and development projects to the military departments
to improve materials, items, and methods within the commodity
"hj.S., Department of Defense, "Defense Supply Council
Meeting, February 7, 1962, 10 a.m.," memorandum from Roswell
Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 26, 1962.
pAbove, p. U5-U6.
-%.S., Defense Supply Agency, Major Arena of Effort or




jurisdictions assigned, and to promote the elimination of
undesirable duplication." In addition, the charter provides
that DSA shell "recommend to the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering any new or changed research and development
projects considered desirable.
"
Thus, in these and other programs such as the Federal
Catalog System administered by the Defense Logistics Services
Center, DSA performs functions which may be considered to be
"semi-technical" in nature. However, it can be readily seen
that these functions are, for the most part, advisory in nature
and that DSA's principal "technical" role is one of influencing
decisions by the military services.
The simplicity of the assertion that an even division
exists in that DSA has the total "supply management"
responsibility for items it manages is also misleading. If
supply management is viewed as the continuum of events beginning
with requirements determination and ending with distribution to
2
the ultimate user, it becomes evident that the military services
are and must be responsible for the events at either end of the
continuum. As pointed out in Chapter II, it is a generally
recognized principal that each military service must retain the
authority and responsibility for requirements determination
based on military plans. Secondly, each military service must
"TJ.S., Department of Defense, Defense Supply Agency




maintain its own operationally sensitive distribution system
sufficient to provide tailored combat support.
The DSA materiel management task then is involved with
the basic wholesale management functions, i.e., providing for
necessary supply catalogs, computing the wholesale stock
requirement to support the anticipated needs of all military
service customers, initiating procurement action to fill stockage
requirements, positioning stocks geographically in accordance
with expected need, determining retention limits, initiating
disposal action for excess quantities, and carrying out the
financial management responsibilities associated with inventory
management.
Supply Management Strategies and
the Requirements Process
In preparing the total Department of Defense
requirements forecast for assigned items for purposes of
procurement, maintenance, positioning, retention and disposal,
DSA computes replenishment requirements based on past experience,
modified through the use of appropriate requirements determi-
nation data furnished by the military services. This requirements
data includes expected changes in program intensity, e.g.,
changes in troop strength, deployment, ration factors, flying
hours and equipment density. In addition, the servioes furnish
1Above, pp. 27-28.
*TJ.S., Department of Defense, Supply Management
Reference Book, p. 55»
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requirements forecasts in support of special one-time programs
such es rebuild, construction, maneuvers and modifications.
The selection of safety levels, required to provide
eech item managed with sufficient protection against an out of
stock position, reflects not only past variability in demand
but also the operational importance of the item to the user,
tempered by the cost of obtaining the justifiable degree of
protection. Selective management techniques are applied in
such a way that the cost and importance of the item dictates the
type and degree of management attention devoted to the item.
Management actions on the relatively inexpensive and/or
unimportant items are highly mechanized with little individual
attention in order to permit concentration of management
p
attention on the more important items.
The role of DSA in direct support of service weapons
systems, although confined to supplying of maintenance support
items which are largely of the commercial type, has expanded to
a level which requires considerable special management attention.
The number of weapons systems receiving intensified management




Aj.S., Defense Supply Agency, An Introduction to the
Defense Supply Agency (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1969), p. 7.
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DSA, which is oriented toward management by commodity,
is not equipped to manage these items on a weapons systems basis.
Rether, the military services identify the weapons systems items
to DSA and this information is integrated into basic management
files as a priority indicator. These items are then given
selective management attention through all phases of inventory
management, procurement and distribution in an effort to assure
continuous stockage and a "never out of stock" supply position.
Conceptually, on the assumption that funding limitations
do not restrict the establishment and use of optimum safety
levels and the use of optimum economic order quantities, supply
management strategies used by DSA afford obvious savings in
both inventory investment and administrative costs associated
with procurement, stockage and distribution of wholesale stocks
of materiel, when compared to the costs associated with separate
management by the individual services.
However, there is evidence that funding limitations
have hampered DSA's ability to perform these functions at the
optimum levels, particularly during the Vietnam War. It is
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Military Supply Systems, Hearings , p. 230.
pU.S., Department of Defense, Supply Management
Reference Book
, pp. 70-71.
%.S., Defense Supply Agency, Memorandum for Record,
"Summery of Actions Associated With the Military Services
Clothing Shortrges," March 7, 1967.
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obvious that the short run savings resulting from funding
restrictions which require reduction of safety levels and less
than optimum buy quantities result in an overall increase in
costs over the long run. The point being made here is not that
integrated materiel management fails to produce overall savings
when compared to management by the individual services. Rather,
the point is that optimal savings cannot be realized if funding
limitations prevent the use of the most efficient supply
management strategies.
The PSA Distribution System and Its Relationship
with Retail Systems
Among the first concerns of DSA after it became
operational was development of an integrated distribution system
of selected distribution installations for DSA managed materiel
which would effectively and economically serve all military
customers. The distribution system study was completed in April
1962 and approved for implementation in December of the same
year. The system was designed with a view toward accomplishment
of the following operational objectives:
(1) Centralized inventory control by commodity;
(?) Customer requisitions submitted to one central
location for each commodity where the requisition would
be edited against system-wide asset availability;
( 3) Supply information provided to the customer
from one point only for each DSA commodity;
(l\.) Maximum use of automatic data processing
equipment;
(5>) Minimum storage installations strategically
located throughout the United States to provide




(6) Be capable of rapid expansion, if required,
in an emergency.
1
The DSA distribution system consists of seven principal
depots and four specialized support depots, geographically
located throughout the continental United States as follows:
Principal Depots:
Defense Construction Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio.
Defense Depot, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.
Defense Depot, Tracy, California.
Defense Depot, Ogden, Utah.
Defense Depot, Memphis, Tennessee.
Defense General Supply Center, Richmond, Virginia.
Atlanta Army Depot, Forest Park, Georgia.
Specialized Support Depots:
Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, Ohio.
Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.
Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Virginia.
Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California.
The principal depots are responsible for the receipt,
storage, stock readiness, inventory and issue of DSA managed
items, including general mobilization reserve stocks, for the
support of specified geographic areas, activities and military
forces. The specialized support depots perform functions similar
U.S., Department of Defense, Supply Management
Reference Book, p. 3k-
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to those of the principal depots, except that their missions
are specialized as to type of materiel or scope of support
responsibilities. The two Navy operated specialized support
depots constitute a unique arrangement in that they support
the fleet, Navy overseas activities and selected Navy activities
within a twenty five mile radius of each. In addition, they
support all military service requirements in emergency situations
when such support is not available elsewhere in the DSA system.
The DSA distribution system also includes ten direct
supply support depots, under military service management, which
have been established in support of large volume users, such as
Navy shipyards, repair facilities and recruit training centers.
The supply mission for DSA materiel at these locations is
restricted to the stocking of Federal Supply Group 95 (metals,
pbars and shapes) and clothing for recruit training centers.
The inventory control function and requisitioning
procedures are centralized by commodity in each of the five
Defense Supply Centers having a supply management responsibility.-
After requisitions are received and processed by the Defense
Supply Centers they are routed to the appropriate depot for issue
"TJ.S. , Congress, House, Committee on Government








Although the DSA distribution system was designed to
meet the needs of military customers in the most efficient and
effective manner, several interface problems with the military
service retail systems still remain. Principal among these
problem areas are the lack of a clear line of demarcation between
wholesale and retail inventories, and support of overseas forces
with centrally managed DSA materiel.
DSA's commodity management mission is confined by its
charter to the wholesale level within the continental United
pStates.
The line of demarcation between wholesale and retail
systems is relatively clear, with some exceptions, in the case
of the Army and Air Force. This relationship with the Navy,
however is by no means clear. As a general rule, Navy wholesale
and retail inventories are merged in coastal supply centers,
depots end industrial facilities. Establishment of a separately
controlled DSA wholesale level as a source of replenishment for
Navy wholesale/retail supply points would require a significant
increase in apgregate defense inventory investment. The dilemma
is this. To leave all tidewater inventories of DSA materiel
under Navy ownership and control would leave a substantial
n[T.S. , Defense Supply Agency, Major Areas of Effort or
Inquiry, Fiscal Year 1966
, p. 11.
U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Supply Agenoy
(DSA) , Directive Number 5105.2?.

73
portion of the total defense wholesale inventory investment
outside of integrated management for other than the procurement
function. Conversely, the placing of tidewater inventories
under the complete ownership and operational management of
DSA would mean e deep intrusion into the Navy's organic supply
system.
The Navy and DSA have compromised on an arrangement
which provides for the positioning of DSA financed inventories
under Navy management at the two coastal specialized support
depots and the Navy managed direct supply support points. This
somewhat complicated arrangement requires that the Navy
activities involved must operate as parts of two dissimilar
systems. The arrangement has proved workable to date. However,
there is a justifiable fear that under extreme emergency
conditions the arrangement could become unsatisfactory in that
both the Navy and DSA would depend on the ready availability
2
of the same stocks for issue to their respective customers.
Because of the restriction of the DSA commodity
management mission to the continental United States, supply
systems in overseas areas are treated as part of the organic
retail systems of the military departments. As a result, three
widely divergent supply systems, which draw upon the same DSA
integrated wholesale supply source, render immediate support to
unified commands. These three operationally sensitive supply
nOT.S., Defense Supply Agency, Major Areas of Effort or






systems range from support of Army units by major depots in the
principal overseas area to the Air Force system under which
overseas units requisition directly on Defense Supply Centers
for direct shipment to overseas bases,
A DSA interface study completed in 1966 suggested the
positioning of selected DSA stocks in overseas areas under a
specialized support depot arrangement as one means of assuring
a single immediate source of supply for all users. However,
without a drastic change in the existing organizational
arrangement, this would add yet another different supply system
serving overseas forces. One possibility which deserves much
further study before conclusions can be reached is a specialized
support depot arrangement which would position DSA owned materiel
under the control of overseas unified commanders. Such an
assignment of retail supply management responsibilities to
unified commanders would be in consonance with military command
structures but would require a major overhaul of overseas
support concepts and organizational arrangements.
The Defense Utilization Program
Inherent in eny well organized activity or business,
and particularly so in an operation as large as the Department








The objective of the Defense Utilization Program, administered
by DSA, is:
• • .transfer of releasable assets between the
military services and the reutilization of excess
materiel to meet new requirements and thereby ..
reduce expenditures for new procurement and repair*
This integrated program, which is an outgrowth of
several earlier somewhat piecemeal efforts, is conducted at the
Defense Logistics Services Center. The program is highly
automated and there is a continuing effort to update screening
procedures by taking advantage of the most modern data processing
techniques available. Basically, the centralized screening
system involves the input of information from service inventory
control points on current and future requirements and releasable
assets, including both supply system releasable stocks and
declared excess reported by using activities. These data are
compared through the common language of the Federal Catalog
System. Interchangeability and substitutability information is
used to enhance the possibility of filling a requirement by
offering possible interchangeable or substitutable materiel.
The latest modification of the system provides positive advice to
the inventory control points on transactions in the screening
o
system.




U.S. , Congress, House, Committee on Government




The -utilization program, in conjunction with the
defensewide visibility of requirements and wholesale assets
provided under the integrated management concept for DSA materiel,
has greatly increased materiel utilization throughout the
Department of Defense. Intraservice and interservice re-
distribution and utilization of materiel resulting directly
from the Defense Utilization Program runs into the billions of
dollars annually.
Relationships with the General Services Administration
Finally, the growing role of the General Services
Administration (GSA) as an integrated materiel manager for the
Department of Defense, and that agency's relationship with DSA
deserve mention.
Prior to the establishment of DSA, the Department of
Defense had reached agreement with GSA whereby that agency
purchased various commodities such as office furniture, military
family housing and quarters furniture and furnishings, and
similar common use items for the military services. In addition,
military service inventory control points referred a very limited
p
number of items to GSA for supply support.
Since DSA became the focal point for the establishment
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government






of support agreements with GSA end became responsible for
monitoring the effectiveness of GSA's support, considerable
progress has been made toward better -utilization of GSA's
services by the Department of Defense.
GSA has developed a systems capability to interface
with defense activities in the use of standardized requisitioning
procedures (MILSTRIP) and the uniform military materiel issue
priority system (UMMIPS) as well as with other systems
developments involving communications and data flow.
As of the end of fiscal year 1968, sixty five federal
supply classes comprising some 68,000 items had been transferred
from the Department of Defense to GSA for integrated materiel
management. The Defense Department is currently GSA's biggest
customer. GSA sales to defense components in 1968 amounted to
377.6 million dollars as compared to total sales of 513 million
pdollars.
Conversely, in an effort to minimize duplication of
effort between the two agencies, DSA has agreed to furnish
support to all federal agencies in several commodity areas
including fuel, electronics materiel and some clothing and
textile items.
Increased cooperation between the two agencies can be









and supply management relationships under a continuing joint




EXPERIENCE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE
There is general agreement among observers of the
Vietnam War that support of United States military forces in
Southeast Asia has far surpassed the standards set in any previous
armed conflicts. Since it has been estimated that approximately
5>0 per cent of the items used by American forces in Vietnam are
managed and supplied by DSA, this experience provides the best
vehicle to date for evaluating the effectiveness of DSA under
emergency conditions.
Unfortunately, this analysis will be somewhat limited
since a comprehensive review of logistics support for forces in
Southeast Asia has not yet been completed. However, such a
review has been initiated recently by the Joint Logistics Review
Group, which was created expressly for the purpose of reviewing
the Vietnam experience with a view toward using this experience
as a basis for planning for future emergencies. This is a
prestigious study group, headed by General Frank Besson, Jr.,
U. S. Army, former Commanding General of the Army Materiel
Command. Each of the military services and DSA are represented on
"4j.S., Defense Supply Agency, Letter, DSAH-LM, "Lessons




the group by personnel at the flag or general officer level.
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed due to the
non-availability of this comprehensive study, it is appropriate
that a review be undertaken of certain key indicators of DSA's
effectiveness and performance during the Vietnam War.
The principal statistical indicator of the effectiveness
of DSA's support is stock availability, which is defined as the
percentage of requisitions received which can be filled from
available stock. Prior to the acceleration of combat operations
in 1965 and 1966, DSA's stock availability was averaging in
excess of 91 per cent. Beginning late in fiscal year 1965, the
buildup of forces in Southeast Asia placed a rapidly escalating
demand on the system, resulting in a drawdown of inventory at a
much more rapid rate than it could be replaced from production.
As a result, overall stock availability declined to a low of 87
per cent in fiscal year 1966 and to an all time low point of
83 per cent in October 1966,
Although these average percentages of availability are
useful indicators, they do not reveal performance by commodities.
The most troublesome DSA commodity during the early days of the
buildup was clothing. For example, during the alltime low month,
October 1966, stock availability for clothing fell to a low of
59 per cent.
"Hj.S., Congress, house, Committee on Government





By Jnne, 1966, overall stock availability returned to
91 per cent and has remained at about that level since that
date. By the end of fiscal year 1968, problems with clothing
had long since been resolved and construction materiel, which
averaged 76 per cent availability, had become the most trouble-
some commodity.
In order to cope with the rapidly increasing demand
resulting from the troop buildup, DSA undertook a greatly
expanded procurement program and amended certain management
strategies.
The most noteworthy change in management techniques
wfis the establishment of an ad hoc clothing problem working
group in Headquarters, DSA to give intensive management attention
to the clothing problem. This group, which was established in
Janunry 1966 and which remained in existence for almost two
years, identified the most critical items and, in effect, managed
priority actions to overcome the problems. These actions included
close liaison with the military services with a view toward
reducing issues to troops, reducing retail stock levels, the
return of used clothing for renovation and reissue, and the
temporary relaxation of clothing specifications in order to attain
increased production. Efforts were also made to obtain earlier
and more accurate planning information with respect to changes
2in troop strengths and other requirements data.
1Ibid.
*1J.S,, Defense Supply Agency, "Summary of Actions
Associated With the Military Services Clothing Shortages."
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Internally within DSA, efforts were exerted to obtain
both increased and accelerated production to meet the rising
demand. Since the troop buildup occurred during a period when
the clothing industry was enjoying near capacity business based
on a high level of consumer demand, it was necessary for DSA
to resort to the use of "mandatory acceptance orders" under
the authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended,
in order to obtain required levels of production.
These and other efforts overcame the clothing problem
and relative normalcy was attained by late 1967. Among the
primary causes of DSA's inability to meet the rising demand were
inadequate safety levels and inadequate mobilization reserve
stocks. These inadequacies were, in turn, due primarily to
p
funding restrictions in the years preceding the Vietnam War.
Turning to construction materiel, a more chronic
problem area, repair parts for construction equipment, materiel
handling equipment and power generating equipment have continued
to be DSA's most difficult support problem over the long run.
The basic causes of these problems are somewhat different than
with clothing. With little or no usage data on these repair
parts for obsolescent equipment and for equipment being used
'"Diane Steed, "Use of Rated Orders" (unpublished
report, Defense Supply Agency, Alexandria, Virginia, 1967).
U.S., Defense Supply Agency, "Summary of Actions
Associated With the Military Services Clothing Shortages."
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under conditions in Vietnam which had not been experienced
before, DSA had never stocked many of the repair parts required
to keep these equipments in operation. Procurement of such
parts requires long lead times and, in many cases, the equipment
and required parts have long since been out of production,
thereby compounding the problem.
Early in 1967, the General Accounting Office completed
a broad survey of the responsivenss of Department of Defense
supply systems in meeting operational needs during the Vietnam
War. Of nine major observations made by the General Accounting
Office, two are of interest with respect to DSA's support of
military forces in Vietnam:
1. The stock fund method of financing the
acquisition of supplies by using units is not
sufficiently responsive to the needs of rapidly
increasing demands. Accordingly, vie believe that
certain modifications to the stock fund system are
necessary with respect to their application to combat
support units.
?. Information regarding increased force levels
and flying hour programs need to be provided to
responsible inventory management officials more
promptly in order to effect timely requirement
determinations and procurement actions.^
Notwithstanding these and other problem areas, DSA
support is viewed by field commanders in Southeast Asia as
"hj.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Military Supply Systems, hearings , p. 218.
nJ.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economy in
Government, Hearings , before the Joint Economic Committee,




ranging from good to excellent. Early in 1968, Lieutenant
General Enrl Hedlund, U. S. Air Force, Director of DSA, returned
from an extensive trip zo the Pacific area where he talked with
field commanders and their top logisticians to develop a
personal evaluation of the effectiveness and responseiveness
of DSA's support. In the case of food, medical items, fuel
and electronics materiel, support was described as excellent.
Support of clothing, construction supplies, industrial materiel
and general supplies was considered to be good.
One can only speculate with respect to a comparison of
DSA's effectiveness and responsiveness with that which would
have existed under previous supply systems or some yet untried
system. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that DSA has
provided adequate support and that the agency has, in fact, come
of age with the experience gained during the Vietnam War.
In capitalizing on this experience, DSA has compiled
a list of "lessons learned" during the Vietnam War for considera-
tion and further study by the Joint Logistics Review Group.
Included in this list is a recognition of problems caused by
funding restraints; the need for earlier and closer participation
in the military planning process to gain better knowledge of
requirements; and the need for better system visibility of stocks,
HJ.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government




including retail system stocks, to assist in making buy decisions,
redistribution deoisions, and to avoid excess stocks.
Implications for the Future
There is no longer any serious speculation concerning
the possibility that the responsibility for management of common
supplies and services will be decentralized to the military
services again. Integrated materiel management is here to stay.
An evaluation of the experience gained during the Vietnam War
strongly suggests that DSA is here to stay. Its success in
wholesale logistics management suggests a continuing trend toward
integrated management and centralization of logistics functions.
With respect to the range of items which may be
assigned to DSA in the future, experience with the logistic
management structures developed within the military departments
suggests that there are three major alternative courses which
integrated management might take:
1, The integrated manager might become the follow-
on manager for all supplies and equipment after the
research and development process is complete, thus,
eventually, encompassing virtually all supplies and
materiel in the Department of Defense at some stage
of their life cycles.
2. The integrated manager might be restricted to
"less technical items" including major end items and
reparables in this category, with the "more technical
items" remaining under unilateral Departmental
management or some form of Departmental single
management.




3. The integrated manager might be restricted
to the management of secondary/consumable items,
thus encompassing the great majority of line items
managed within the Department of Defense, although
accounting for a relatively small portion of the
total value of inventories and procurement.
1
The other area of possible expansion of integrated
materiel management is the functional span of the commodity
management mission.
DSA does not have the responsibility for computation
of mobilization and special program requirements, since this is
considered to be an essential responsibility of the military
departments. For the same reason, DSA has little or no
responsibility for functions which would require a significant
in-house technical capability such as research and development,
specification development, provisioning, engineering support,
p
and the performance of depot maintenance.
Although significant changes in these areas would
require amendment of existing management concepts, none of these
changes would be so drastic as was the shift to integrated
meteriel management itself.
^J.S., Defense Supply Agency, Major Areas of Effort or






Although there was early recognition of the need for
improving the arrangement for provision of common supplies and
services to the military departments, the search for the optimal
arrangement hes been long, tedious and controversial.
Integration of materiel management was made possible
by centralization of the defense management function resulting
from the National Security Act of 19i;7 and subsequent legislation.
However, it is doubtful that a great deal of progress toward
integration would have taken place without the constant
congressional pressure which nudged the Department of Defense
into notion.
The single manager plan, although a giant step in the
direction of integrated management, was essentially a compromise
measure. This approach may have constituted the blueprint for
future integration had it not been for the lack of coordination
and standardization as a result of differing policies and
procedures adopted by the single manager operating agencies.
Upon assuming his duties as Secretary of Defense,
Robert McNamara had decided on the single agency approach to
integrated materiel management. The only question that remained




arrangement would be best. The decision to establish a separate
agency which reports directly to the Secretary of Defense was
a sound one. It affords the Director of DSA direct access to
top management. There is no doubt that this arrangement has
been a factor in DSA's success.
DSA's ability to quickly organize and show immediate
progress was greatly enhanced by the fact that the agency took
command of "going concern" activities. Thus the agency was able
to concentrate on refinement of management practices and
standardization of systems and procedures rather than organizing
an entirely new agency.
The establishment of DSA impacted heavily on the
defense logistics environment. Although major changes were
required in military supply systems, the integrity of these
departmental supply systems has been maintained.
Even though the Vietnam experience revealed an apparent
need for DSA to gain better visibility of military requirements
by more active liaison with the military planning process, the
agency has established effective working relationships with
appropriate levels in the military departments as well as with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
DSA has proven to be a viable organization, adapting
readily to changing mission assignments and responsibilities.
Important organization changes and consolidation of functions
have been undertaken in an effort to reduce operating costs.
Substantial savings in both inventory investment and operatin
g
costs have been realized concurrently with a continuation of
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effective support of the military services.
The assumption of the responsibility for overseas
support of decentralized and non-cataloged items for the Army
and Air Force is considered to be incongruous with the concept
of integrated materiel management and with the basic mission of
DSA.
The division of responsibility between DSA and the
military services for items assigned to integrated materiel
management is relatively clear and is considered to be based on
sound concepts. There is, however, a "gray area" between the
military services' technical responsibilities and DSA's supply
management responsibilities. The trend appears to be toward
increased assumption of technical responsibilities by DSA.
The supply management strategies used by DSA are
conceptually sound. The two primary problem areas which prevent
optimum use of these strategies are funding restrictions imposed
by higher authority and lack of complete visibility of require-
ments and retail level assets.
The DSA distribution system is efficient and effective.
Due to the Novy's unique support arrangement whereby wholesale
and retail stocks are merged in coastal supply centers and
depots, there is no clear line of demarcation with respect to
DSA's wholesale stocks and the Navy's retail stocks. This
arrangement, although cumbersome, has proven to be workable under
conditions to date. A proposal to position DSA wholesale stocks
in overseas locations under the control of unified commanders
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would require a complete rethinking of organizational structures
end support concepts.
Working relationships with the General Services
Administration have improved. GSA has assumed increased
responsibilities with respect to support of military forces.
With this new atmosphere of cooperation, GSA can be expected to
assume an increasing role in integrated materiel management for
the Department of Defense.
The Vietnam War has provided the first real test of
DSA's ability to support military forces under emergency
conditions. There have been problems, but one must conclude
that the agency has successfully met the challenge. Although
comparisons with what might have been under some other system
are impossible, there is no reason to believe that another
arrangement for the provision of common supplies would have been
more successful.
The principle requisites for effective materiel
management have been met by DSA. The concept of centralization
of management of common supplies and services is sound.
There is every reason to believe that DSA provides the
Department of Defense with a long-term blueprint for the
integration of common supply and service activities. The only
question which remains is what form increased integration will
take. The trend appears to be toward an increase of the range of
items assigned to integrated materiel management as well as an
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